Introduction
The impact of bank competition on financial markets and firms is an important topic for policymakers and researchers alike. 1 Interest on this subject intensified during the recent global financial crisis, as many questioned whether high competition was partly to blame. 2 At the same time, the downfall of some institutions as a result of the crisis and the emergency measures taken by some governments to deal with this episode -such as mergers, bailouts, recapitalizations, and extension of guarantees-have led to concerns about the future of bank competition and its potential implication for access to bank finance.
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How bank competition affects firms' access to finance is in itself a much debated question in the economic literature and in policy circles and, as we discuss below, the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence on this subject are mixed. Combining multi-year firmlevel surveys with panel country-level data on bank competition for 53 countries, this paper offers new evidence on the link between competition and firms' access to finance. In particular, our paper evaluates whether competition improves access to finance and analyzes the extent to which different features of the environment in which banks operate affect the link between competition and access.
Theory provides ambiguous predictions regarding the impact of competition on access to finance. The conventional market power hypothesis argues that competition in the banking system reduces the cost of finance and increases the availability of credit. On the other hand, the information hypothesis argues that, in the presence of information asymmetries and agency costs, competition can reduce access by making it more difficult for banks to internalize the benefits of investing in building lending relationships, in particular, with opaque clients (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Marquez, 2002; Hausewald and Marquez, 2006 'Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2008) document that the rapid growth of credit in U.S. mortgage markets in the run up to the crisis was accompanied by a reduction in lending standards (lower loan application denial rates), which they argue was in part explained by the entry of new and large lending institutions. 3 See OECD (2009, 2010) . 4 the Lerner index are not consistent with results using concentration measures as proxies for competition. They conclude that concentration is not a good measure of competition.
As described above, existing studies on the link between competition and financial access either analyze cross-sectional data or are only able to look at multi-year data for a single country.
In contrast, our paper combines multi-year firm-level data with panel country-level data on bank competition. One advantage of our dataset is that it contains repeated cross-sections of firms for the countries in our sample. This allows us to control for unobserved differences between countries, using country fixed effects in our estimations. Such unobserved differences may be correlated with both access to finance and the extent of competition. Thus, our methodology isolates within country variation in competition and access. This is an improvement over previous cross-country studies, such as Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) .
Furthermore, in contrast to US and cross-country studies that measure competition with concentration indicators, we also present results using the Lerner index, a direct measure of bank pricing behavior. Several studies have argued theoretically and empirically that pricing behavior measures such as the Lerner index are superior to concentration measures as indicators of competition. 8 Concentration is a measure of market structure, while competition is a measure of market conduct. There can be competition in concentrated markets, if there is a credible threat of entry and exit (i.e., if markets are contestable). A contribution of our paper is the ability to distinguish the impact of concentration and competition in a multi-country setting. Also, the fact that we offer cross-country evidence using the Lerner index allows for more general results relative to those that focus on individual countries.
We find that low competition, as proxied by high levels of the Lerner index, is associated with diminished access to finance by firms, while concentration has a less robust relationship with access. We use different weighting schemes to account for differences in the number of firms across countries and the variance of the estimated Lerner index. Overall, our results support the market power hypothesis. Furthermore, our results confirm that concentration measures are not reliable predictors of firms' access to finance, which is in line with previous contradictory evidence. 5 In addition, we explore whether the characteristics of the environment in which banks operate affect the impact of competition on access to finance. 9 To do that, we interact our measures of competition with country-level measures of financial development, the availability of credit information, and government bank ownership. We find that countries with higher levels of financial development and better information availability experience a less pronounced decline in access to finance as a result of low levels of competition (high values of the Lerner index). The flip side of this finding is that low competition is more detrimental for firms operating in countries with low levels of financial development or lacking credit information. In addition, we find that significant government bank ownership exacerbates the damaging impact of low bank competition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our multiple datasets and presents summary statistics. Section 3 outlines our regression model. Section 4 presents our baseline results. Section 5 discusses the results interacting the competition measures with different aspects of the environment in which banks operate. Section 6 concludes. Appendices A1 and A2 contain detailed descriptions of the construction of the firm-level measure of access to finance and the estimation method for the Lerner index, respectively.
Data
We combine firm-, bank-and country-level data from various sources. Table 1, Panel A gives a list of all the variables used in the paper and details their sources. The firm-level data come from World Bank Enterprise Surveys. 10 The data are collected in several waves and contain repeated cross-sections for the countries in our sample. Because our goal is to isolate within country variation in competition across time, we only focus on countries that have survey data for at least two years.
We use firm survey data to construct our measure of access to finance and several control variables. Access to finance is an indicator variable that equals one when a firm has a loan, overdraft, or line of credit, and zero otherwise. We prefer to use this objective measure of access 9 Beck et al. (2004) analyze how different aspects of the institutional and regulatory environment, as well as the ownership structure of the banking system, affect the impact of bank concentration on firms' perceptions of financing obstacles. 10 The data are available at www.enterprisesurveys.org 6 to credit, rather than subjective measures of financing obstacles, because the former is more comparable across countries and it does not depend on cultural biases that might influence individuals' perceptions; plus it is more reliable and easier to interpret. Appendix A1 gives a detailed description of the process used to construct our measure of access to finance.
We also include several firm-level variables that may influence the extent of firms' access to finance, such as firm size, measured as log of the number of employees, a dummy for manufacturing industry (the omitted category is service and other industries), a dummy for exporting firms, a dummy for foreign-owned firms, a dummy for government-owned firms, and the log of firm age in years.
The bank-level data come from Bankscope, a commercial database by Bureau Van Dijk including annual balance sheet and income statement information for banks across the world.
Only banks classified as commercial, cooperative, Islamic, savings, and bank holding companies are considered in the analysis. We leave out central banks and investment banks, because they are not directly involved in providing loans to firms.
We use bank-level data to construct the Lerner index, a direct measure of pricing behavior by banks, which captures the markup in prices -i.e., the difference between prices and marginal costs, measured as a ratio of prices. Table A1 gives a list of the countries and years included in the final dataset.
Some countries have had only two surveys in our time frame, while others have had three or more, with a maximum of five surveys for Bulgaria. The coverage of firms varies by country.
For example, India has more than 4,000 firms covered in two surveys, while Malawi has fewer than 300 firms covered in two surveys. Because of this variation, we test the robustness of our results to weighting our regressions by the inverse of the square root of the number of firms in the survey, so that each country carries the same importance in our estimations. Our bank-level sample contains data on 3,409 banks and over 16,000 bank-year observations. Table A2 gives a list of countries in our sample along with the value of the Lerner index for each country over time.
14 Finally, we supplement our dataset with annual country-level data from several sources.
We obtain data on private credit to GDP and inflation from the World Bank World Development 
Regression Model
Our goal is to evaluate the impact of bank competition on firms' access to finance. To do that, we estimate the following simple model:
where Access is the indicator variable for whether firm i in country c at time t has a bank loan, line of credit, or overdraft; Competition refers to either the Lerner index or to two measures of concentration: the share of assets held by the top three banks and the Herfindahl index. F and X represent firm-level (e.g., size, manufacturing, exporter, etc.) and country-level (e.g., inflation
and financial development as proxied by private credit to GDP) control variables, respectively, described in the data section. We capture unobservable differences between countries by including country fixed effects (represented in equation 1 by a c ) and we cluster errors at the 9 country-year level. 18 Thus, our estimates represent within country variation in the relationship between competition and access to finance. We assume that country-level measures of competition are exogenous to the firm-level measure of access to finance. In other words, each individual firm is small enough to affect country-level measures of bank competition. However, to further mitigate any possible reverse causality concerns, we use one year lagged values for competition, as well as for the other country-level control variables.
We use several weighting schemes in our estimations. First, because the Lerner index is an estimated variable, we weight our regression by the inverse of its standard deviation. This takes into account the precision with which the Lerner index is estimated and gives less weight to those observations that are estimated with less precision (i.e., that have larger standard errors).
Second, because the number of firms varies for different surveys, we weight our regressions by the inverse of the square root of the number of observations (i.e., firms) in each country-year.
This gives relatively less weight to countries with a large number of observations, which otherwise will be overrepresented in the sample. Third, we combine the two weighting factors in a product form (i.e., the weight equals the product of the inverse of the Lerner's standard deviation and the inverse of the square root of the number of firms in the country and year).
Finally, we also report regressions without any weights for comparison.
Baseline Results
Table 2 reports our baseline results for the estimation of equation (1 This establishes our first main result that low competition (i.e., a high value of the Lerner index)
is associated with lower access to finance, while the link between concentration and access to finance is not significant. Weighting regressions by the inverse of the standard deviation for the Lerner index does not materially alter our results (compare column (b) to column (a) in Table 2 ).
18 Because of the inclusion of country fixed effects and to avoid an incidental parameters problem, we report our results using a linear probability model, however, our results are robust to using a fixed effects logit model.
Since we estimate the regressions using a linear probability model, we can interpret the coefficient on the Lerner index as an increase in the probability of access to finance. In our sample, one standard deviation of the Lerner index is about 0.07. Using the estimated coefficient of about 0.75 (from model (b) in Table 2 , which corrects for the variance of the Lerner index by appropriate weighting), we obtain that a one standard deviation change in the Lerner index results in an approximately 5 percentage points change in the probability of having access to finance. In our sample, the average access to finance dummy equals one for about 60 percent of all firms, with a standard deviation of about 49 percent. A 5 percentage points change is modest for an average country, but it is more economically important for a country with low access to start with.
Most of the control variables have the predicted signs. Larger and older firms are more likely to have access to finance. Manufacturing firms are more likely than service and retail enterprises to have access to finance, because they have more collateral which helps them obtain financing. Exporters also are more likely to have access to bank finance, however, foreignowned firms are less likely. This might be because foreign firms can obtain financing from their parent company and, thus do not need to borrow from local banks. At the same time, government-owned firms appear less likely to have access to bank finance, which is a little surprising. We find that private credit, which is our measure of financial development, is associated with a higher likelihood of access to finance. The inflation rate has a negative association with our measure of access to finance, which is not surprising. Note that because of the country fixed effects, these variables capture the impact of the variation in inflation and private credit from the long-run country average.
In Table 3 we present our robustness checks with regressions weighted by the inverse of the square root of the number of firms in the country-year survey. Because there is a large variation in the number of firms in each survey and our variables of interest are measured at the country-year level, the regressions reported so far give more weight to surveys with a larger number of firms, which will have a disproportional impact on the estimated coefficients. We find that weighting by the inverse of the number of firms has no impact on the significance of the Lerner index. We continue to find that low competition has a negative impact on firms' access to finance.
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Interaction Results
The damaging impact of low levels of competition on access could be either mitigated or exacerbated by certain features of the environment in which banks operate. Here we investigate three such factors. First, we consider the extent of financial development in a country, measured by the ratio of private credit to GDP. This measure implicitly captures the institutional factors that determine the level of financial development, such as property rights protection or contract enforcement, as well as the actual use of finance by the private sector. We investigate whether the impact of competition varies depending on countries' levels of financial development.
Our hypothesis is that financial development will mitigate the damaging impact of lack of competition. As we discussed above, the market power hypothesis argues that competition in the banking market reduces the cost of finance and increases the availability of credit. Financial development is commonly associated with reduced cost of finance and wider availability of finance (see King and Levine, 1993 and Love, 2003) . Therefore, in an environment with relatively low cost of finance, the marginal negative impact of low competition on costs is likely to be less damaging than in an environment where the costs are high to start with. Similarly, in an environment with wider availability of finance, the reduction in credit availability that is due to lack of competition is likely to be less damaging than in an environment with more scarcely available finance. Therefore, we anticipate that financial development will lessen the damaging impact of low competition on access.
Our second variable of interest is credit information. Availability of credit information is directly linked to the impact of competition through the information hypothesis discussed in the introduction. The hypothesis states that in the presence of information asymmetries and agency costs, competition can reduce access to finance by making it more difficult for banks to internalize the benefits of investing in building lending relationships, in particular, with opaque clients (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Marquez, 2002) . Therefore, with improvement in the availability of information through public or private credit registries, the information asymmetries are reduced and, thus, the impact of low competition on access to finance through its impact on information production is likely to be reduced. Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi, 2007; Micco, Panizza, and Yañez, 2007; Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2009; and Farazi, Feyen and Rocha, 2011, among others) . In competitive environments the inefficiencies of government ownership could be mitigated by the pressure from competitors to government-owned banks. On the flip side, in countries with high government bank ownership lack of competition can be especially damaging as the checks and balances introduced by market mechanisms may be weak or absent. Thus, we expect that high government bank ownership will exacerbate the negative impact of low competition on access.
To investigate whether the impact of competition measures on access to finance varies as a function of country-level characteristics such as financial development, credit information, and government bank ownership, we interact each of these country-level variables with our measure of competition, while simultaneously adding the same country-levels variable by themselves in the regression. The three measures and their sources are described in Table 1A . Table 4 reports our results for the interaction of financial development and competition.
We observe a negative sign on the Lerner, as before, and a positive interaction with the measure of financial development. For both concentration measures we observe similar patternsnegative for concentration and positive for the interaction term.
The magnitude of the coefficients in model (a) implies that for a country with an average level of financial development in our sample (which equals to 0.4), the marginal impact of the Lerner index is about 0.6; for a country with low financial development (such as one standard deviation below the average), the marginal impact is twice as large and the magnitude is about 1.2; while for a country with a high level of financial development (such as one standard deviation above the average) the marginal impact of the Lerner index is about zero. Translating these effects into changes in the probability of access to finance, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the Lerner results in a drop of almost 8 percentage points in the likelihood 13 of access to finance, when financial development is low. The same change in the Lerner leads to a 4 percentage points decline in the probability of access to finance for firms in a country with an average level of financial development, and no change in the likelihood of access to finance for those firms in a country with high levels of financial development. Table 5 presents the interactions with the country-level credit information index. 19 Once again, we observe that the Lerner index is negative and highly significant, while the interaction with credit information is positive and highly significant. The results for the Herfindahl index are similar, while in the case of the share of assets held by the top 3 banks neither the measure by itself nor the interaction are significant.
The credit information index varies from zero to six, with an average of about 3 and a standard deviation of 2. Using coefficients estimated in model (a), our results suggest that for a country with average credit information, the Lerner has a negative impact of 0.85, while for a country with low credit information (one standard deviation below the average), the impact more than doubles to 1.96. On the other hand, for countries with a high level of credit information (one standard deviation above the average), the impact is close to 0.27. Translating these into a probability of access to finance, we find that in a country with low credit information availability, a one standard deviation increase in the Lerner index results in about a 13 percentage point decrease in the probability of using a financial product such as a loan, line of credit or an overdraft. However, in a country with high credit information availability there is practically no impact. Thus, better credit information significantly mitigates the negative impact of low competition or high concentration.
Finally, in Table 6 we show interactions with the country average share of government bank ownership. Here, we observe that the interactions are negative and significant, suggesting that higher government bank ownership is associated with a more damaging impact of low competition and high concentration. The Lerner index by itself is not significant, which suggests that when government ownership of banks in the country is zero, the impact of competition or 14 concentration on access to finance is also zero. However, in countries with high government ownership, the negative impact is significant.
The average government ownership in our sample is 0.25 with a standard deviation of 0.23. These numbers suggest that in a country with average government ownership the impact of Lerner is 0.79, while in a country that is one standard deviation above the average the impact is about twice as large, at 1.5. This translates into a decline in the probability of access to finance of about 10 percentage points as a result of a one standard deviation increase in the Lerner index in a country with high government bank ownership. The same impact is only 5 percent in a country with average government bank ownership and close to zero in a country without any government bank ownership.
To summarize, we find that the impact of competition and concentration depends on the environment in which banks operate. This may explain the contradictory results observed in the previous literature, as in some countries the negative impact of low levels of competition may be mitigated by some positive factors such as availability of credit information or the overall level of financial development, while in other countries the impact may be exacerbated by factors such as high government bank ownership.
Conclusions
The theory on the impact of bank competition on access to finance offers conflicting predictions and the empirical literature provides mixed results and suffers from a number of limitations.
Combining multi-year firm-level data on access to finance with panel country-level data on bank competition, this paper offers new evidence on the link between competition and access to finance. One advantage of our dataset is that it allows us to control for unobserved differences between countries, using country fixed effects. Thus, we are able to isolate within country variation in competition and access to finance. Also, contrary to other studies that equate concentration with competition, we conduct estimations using direct measures of banks' pricing behavior.
Our results indicate that higher bank competition, as measured by lower levels of the Lerner index, increases firms' access to finance, while commonly used concentration measures 15 are not reliable or robust predictors of financial access. In addition, we find that the impact of competition on access to finance depends on the environment in which banks operate and some features of the environment, such as higher levels of financial development and better credit information, can mitigate the damaging impact of low competition, while other characteristics, such as high government bank ownership, can exacerbate the negative impact.
Overall, our results suggest that there are benefits to promoting bank competition. We leave for future research an analysis of the specific policies (e.g., adopting low barriers to bank entry and exit, fostering competitive pressures from non-bank competitors, facilitating access to credit information, implementing measures to ensure consumer protection, etc.) that regulators can implement to increase competition in the banking sector. 
Country-Level Variables
Lerner index
Lerner index constructed using variables from Bankscope (see Appendix 2).
Concentration 3
Fraction of total assets held by top 3 banks from Bankscope.
Herfindahl index
Herfindahl index calculated as the sum over all banks in the country of the squared market share (in terms of assets) of each bank from Bankscope.
Inflation rate Inflation calculated as the annual change in the GDP deflator from the World Development Indicators (WDI) World Bank. Financial development Domestic credit to the private sector (fraction of GDP) from WDI.
Credit information index
Depth of credit information index is a measure of the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry or a private credit bureau, both by law, and in practice. (0-6) obtained from Doing Business Indicators.
Share of government-owned banks
Fraction of banking system's assets in banks that are 50% or more government-owned from the World Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey. The regressions below are estimated using country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. The dependent variable Access to finance is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has access to a loan, overdraft, or a line of credit. 
Regressions Correcting for Differences in the Number of Firms Across Countries
The regressions below are estimated using country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. The dependent variable Access to finance is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has access to a loan, overdraft, or a line of credit. The Lerner index is a measure of competition (higher values imply lower levels of competition). The Herfindahl index (HI) and Concentration 3 are measures of concentration. Log firm size is the logarithm of the number of permanent employees. Log firm age is the logarithm of the firm's age in years. Government-owned and Foreign-owned are dummy variables that equal one if the firm has government or foreign ownership, respectively. Exporter is a dummy variable that indicates if the firm is an exporting firm.
Manufacturing is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is in the manufacturing industry. Financial development is measured as domestic credit to the private sector as a fraction of GDP. The inflation rate is measured as the growth rate of the GDP deflator (annual). Results in columns (a), (c), and (d) are weighted by the inverse of the square root of the number of firms; those in column (b) are weighted by the inverse of (the square root of the number of firms  the inverse of the standard deviation of the Lerner Index). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. The regressions below are estimated using country fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level. The dependent variable Access to finance is a dummy variable that indicates whether the firm has access to a loan, overdraft, or a line of credit. 
